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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Solomon Islands is a small nation of less than half a million inhabitants 
spread across many islands. An armed conflict erupted there in 1998, with small-scale 
actions by one ethnic group eventually leading to a war between the two rival ethnic 
groups, leaving the machinery of the State ineffective. During the conflict both factions 
committed atrocities against each other and civilians. The police were also implicated in 
human rights abuses, with individual officers identifying with different factions 
depending on their ethnicity.-Eventually a cease-fire was brokered and the Townsville 
Peace Agreement1 (TP A) between the two warring groups and the government negotiated 
in October 2000. The most controversial aspects of the peace agreement were a blanket 
amnesty from prosecution for all actions during the period of the conflict and the 
continuation of employment for police officers who participated in the conflict. 
The gaps in humanitarian law as it relates to internal conflicts and prosecuting 
those that breach the provisions are amply illustrated by the Solomon Islands conflict. It 
was a small-scale conflict in world terms attracting little attention on the world stage, but 
shares similarities with conflicts such as in the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo and Rwanda. 
Ethnic tensions were the root of the conflict, and ethnicity determined the fate of 
individuals. Thousands of Malaitan civilians were forced from their homes, either 
relocating to the island of Malaita, or to Malaitan enclaves on Guadalcanal. Many 
continue to require humanitarian relief to survive in a place they did not choose to live. 
Combatants and civilians were beaten, tortured and killed. Although the numbers of 
people affected are small compared to other conflicts, proportionate to the pre-conflict 
population of Guadalcanal , the harm caused to the civilian population was immense. 2 
Despite documented breaches of international law, Amnesty International was alone in 
condemning the amnesty from prosecution given to those responsible.3 
The humanitarian law of war provides for the protection of individuals affected by 
armed conflict, both civilians and combatants. The core of the law is found in the Geneva 
Conventions (the Conventions) of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977. The major 
weakness in the theoretical basis of the Conventions is their lack of applicability, as a 
1 Signed 15 October 2000. The agreement is available at <http://www.commerce.gov.sb/Others> (last 
accessed 10 September 2001). Following this agreement. a further agreement relevant to the Marau area 
only, the Marau Peace Agreement was finalised. 
2 The pre-conflict population of Guadalcanal was approximately 100,000 and in Malaita 96,000. 
(Population figures from lonely Planet Guide to the South Pacific (1 ed, Lonely Planet Publications Pty 
Ltd. Melbourne, 2000) 658, 690). Estimated displacement figures are of 20,000 Malaitans to Malaita and 
12,000-18,000 within Guadalcanal . ("Experts Group Meeting on the Post Conflict Situation in the Solomon 
Islands" Session ill, 2. Report available at 
<http://www.peoplefirst.net. sb/General/Reports/Experts _Group_ 2.htm> (last accessed 18 September 
2001). Therefore, almost 40 per cent of the Guadalcanal population was displaced half of these to another 
island. 
3 Amnesty International prepared the only report of incidences breaching humanitarian law, see "Solomon 
Islands: A forgotten conflict'' (7 September 2000) Amnesty International. 
<http.://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsi/index/ASA430052000> (last viewed 18 August 2001). It condemned 
the amnesty in media statements cited on page 25 .. 
2 
whole, to armed conflicts within states. Their practical weaknesses are lack of 
compliance and prosecution for non-compliance. While there has been a recent increase 
in prosecutions and a trend towards blurring the distinctions between international and 
internal conflicts4, the reality is that many internal conflicts have and will continue to be 
resolved by states providing amnesties to combatants from prosecution. Amnesties can 
potentially render all efforts to punish those that breach humanitarian law useless, and so 
are deserving of more attention in the international arena. 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), assuming 
its success in setting up a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC), provides an 
opportunity for international law to throw more weight behind the principle of providing 
justice to victims of internal conflicts. The ICC may take action to prosecute individuals 
where states are unwilling or unable to do so. The potential for the ICC to prosecute 
regardless of an amnesty given by a state may encourage states and those involved in 
armed conflicts to accept constraints on the type of amnesties given. Amnesties may be 
necessary to end conflicts, but they can also provide alternative forms of justice. A just 
amnesty is arguably more likely to be recognised by the ICC. 
This paper refers to the Solomon Islands conflict to provide an illustration of the 
theoretical difficulties in determining_ which provisions of the Conventions and Protocols 
are applicable in internal conflicts. The amnesty given to combatants in the Solomon 
Islands conflict is considered in relation to its compliance with the Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocols and other international human rights provisions. In light of the 
Rome Statute's potential to constrain the breadth of amnesties given for breaching 
humanitarian law, particular attention is given to the blanket amnesty from prosecution 
for all actions during the period of the conflict. 
II THE SOLOMON ISLANDS' CONFLICT 
A. Background 
The Solomon Islands is a group of 990 islands spread over 1300 kilometres in the 
South Pacific, its nearest neighbour being Papua New Guinea. It is divided into nine 
provinces consisting of the larger settled islands of Guadalcanal, Saint Isabel, Choiseul, 
Malaita, Makira, and smaller clusters of islands, many of the which are uninhabited. The 
population is primarily Melanesian. 
The islands ' identity as a state began in the late 19th century when Britain gained 
control of the island group and named it the British Solomon Islands Protectorate. During 
World War II the Japanese invaded the Solomon Islands and began building an airfield 
on Guadalcanal. The United States Navy attacked, starting a battle for control of the 
Solomons that lasted six months, with the United States eventually gaining the upper 
hand. By the end of the war there was a large American base on Guadalcanal providing 
employment for Solomon Islanders. A pro-American movement opposing British rule 
4 Theodore Meron "The Humanization of Humanitarian Law" (2000) 94 Am J Int'l L 239.261. 
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started after the war but died down when the Americans withdrew in 1950. Britain 
introduced local government and eventually an elected governing council in 1970. In 
1978 the Solomon Islands was granted independence and was relatively stable until the 
conflict in 1998. 
The capital, Honiara, is situated on Guadalcanal. After WWII, people from the 
island of Malaita migrated to Honiara, attracted to work opportunities created by the 
United States base, and eventually dominating Honiara, causing resentment among the 
ethnic Guale. Honiara has a separate political status from the provincial government that 
represents the interests of the rest of Guadalcanal, and the ethnic Guale resented the 
influence the Malaitans had in their capital. 
The country is relatively poor. It ranks 122 out of 174 countries on the 1997 UN 
Human Development Index, which measures longevity, literacy and the standard of 
living. There are significant disparities.- in income within and between geographical areas. 
The UN has accorded the Solomon Islands "least developed nation" status. 5 There had 
been longstanding demands to successive governments to compensate ethnic Guale for 
loss of land on Guadalcanal due to the location of central government in Honiara, and 
industrial developments on the island. 
The 1998-2000 conflict was.- predominantly between the Isatabu Freedom 
Movement (IFM)6 and the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF). It attracted some international 
attention, mainly near neighbours who were members.- of from the Commonwealth of 
Nations. 7 The Red Cross provided humanitarian relief and Amnesty International sent an 
envoy to the Solomons to investigate and report on the conflict. 8 
The Office of the Prime Minister issued a series of statements in March 2000 
suggesting an underlying cause for the conflict was the then new Government' s attempts 
to reform economic systems that favoured a "network of cronies" who were the "real 
rulers" of the Solomon Islands. The report says the drive to reform the economy and rid 
the country of corrupt practices was.- a catalyst for the escalation in demands. being put to 
the Government by the two ethnic groups and the opposition. 9 
At a meeting held in Brisbane soon after the TP A was negotiated, an advisor to 
the Solomon Islands Development Trust, Dr John Roughan, put forward several reasons 
5 United Nations Development Programme Solomon Islands. Available at 
<http://www.undp.org.fj/soi/solomonprog.htm> (last accessed 10 September 2001). 6 The predecessor to this group was the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA); the IMF was not formed 
until January 2000. See Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Solomon Islands Country 
Brief, (May 2001) 3. <http://dfat.gov.au/geo/Solomon_lslands_brief.htm>(last accessed 8 August 2001. 7 The Commonwealth of Nations is a group of 54 countries, including the Solomon Islands, connected to 
each other, in some cases indirectly, through being governed at some stage by Britain. 8 "Solomon Islands: A forgotten conflict" (7 September 2000) Amnesty International, 9. 
<http.://www.web.amnesty.org/ai .nsi/index/ASA430052000> (last viewed 18 August 2001). 9 'Beneath Guadalcanal· in The Underlying Cause of the Ethnic Tension (1 ed, March 2000). 
<http://commerce.govt.gov.sb/Ministries/Beneath_ Guadalcanal_l.htm> (last accessed 9 September 2001). 
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for the conflict. 10 He refers to the influence of people from Bougainville who fled to 
Guadalcanal during the 10-year conflict in their country and similarities between the 
position of the people from Bougainville and the ethnic Guadalcanal people (Guale) in 
relation to the Malaitans in Honiara. The Bougainvillians and Guale are matrilineal 
societies; the Malaitans are patrilineal. The Bougainvillians had managed to drive away 
the Highlanders from Bougainville, and had taken on and beaten their government, and 
their experience encouraged the Guale's opposition to the Malaitans settled in 
Guadalcanal. Dr Roughan also cited growing poverty caused by successive 
mismanagement by governments, disaffection of the large youth population and the 
concentration of development in urban areas when the majority of people lived in villages 
as other causes for the conflict. 
B. Chronology of the conflict 
The preamble to the TPA begins by referring to events dating from early 1998: 11 
~ereas since late April 1998, armed groups of Guadalcanal youths, angry 
about perceived government inaction in addressing their people' s grievances 
(which dated back to 1988 through peaceful demonstration) engaged in 
activities forcing_ the eviction. from. Guadalcanal of settlers from other islands. 
especially Malaita settlers, and the displacement of approximately 20,000 
Malaitans. 
At the request of the Solomon Islands Government, the Commonwealth, through 
its Secretariat, sent a Special Envoy headed by former Prime Minister of Fiji Sitiveni 
Rabuka to assist with bringing a peaceful solution to the conflict. In 1999 the UN Human 
Rights Commissioner also sent a representative to assist, but on-going assistance to the 
Government was limited to the Commonwealth nations, especially its Pacific neighbours 
of Fiji, Vanuatu, Australia and New Zealand. Police from Fiji and Vanuatu, also under 
the auspices of the Commonwealth, were sent to assist with re-establishing law and order 
in Guadalcanal. 
Prior to the TP A several peace agreements were negotiated but failed to stop the 
conflict. The first of these agreements was signed in June 1999 between the Government 
and representatives of the provincial governments of Guadalcanal and Malaita as 
representatives of the people. 12 It stated that all organisations that had been using force to 
remove Malaitan people from Guadalcanal would be dissolved and that violence would 
no longer continue as a way to resolve the crisis. It also addressed land issues that 
concerned the people of Guadalcanal. 
The conflict continued and the Government declared a state of emergency in June 
1999, passing emergency regulations that gave the police special powers permitting the 
10 "Experts Group Meeting on the Post Conflict Situation in the Solomon Islands."(19-20 October 2000) 
Session ill. 2. <http://www.peoplefirst.net.sb/General/Reports/Experts_ Group_2.htm> (last accessed 18 
September 2001). 
11 Townsville Peace Agreement, Preamble, para 1. 
12 The Honiara Peace Accord (28 June 1999) l. <http://commerce.govt.gov.sb/Ministries/Beneath_ 
Guadalcana1_3 .htm> (last accessed 9 September 2001). 
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use of violence in the course of their duties, if acting in good faith. 13 The regulations also 
outlawed membership of organisations promoting the interests of ethnic populations by 
force. A second peace agreement 14 was made two months later between the police, the 
national Government and the Guadalcanal provincial government. It explicitly recognised 
the role of the police15 in the conflict by promising to restrain their activities to the use of 
minimum force, and reiterated that illegal organisations formed with the purposes of 
advancing the interests of ethnic groups were to be disbanded. In October 1999, the 
Prime Minister publicly acknowledged for the first time that an organised prn-Malaitan 
armed force existed. 16 The conflict continued and a third agreement 17 .in February 2000 
addressed specific concerns of the Guale relating to the constitution, land, police 
activities and internal migration. 
The third agreement was also ineffectual. The hostilities reached a peak when the 
MEF, with the assistance of police officers, held the Prime Minister Mr Ulufa'alu hostage 
for eight days. He was released only after he met the demand for his resignation on 13 
June 2000. 
Peace talks, facilitated by the Australian and New Zealand Governments and held 
on board naval vessels began in July 2000. The result was a cease-fire agreement on 3 
September 2000 that included a provision for further peace negotiations to be concluded 
in 90 days. In October 2000,_ representatives of the Solomon Islands Government, 
militant groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) met in Australia. The TPA 
was signed on 15 October. It provided for an amnesty for all those involved in the 
conflict from prosecution for any criminal acts, 18 for offences in relation to possessing or 
stealing weapons, 19 as well as immunity from civil suit.20 Police and paramilitary 
officers who had been involved in the conflict by assisting either of the militant groups 
were permitted to remain in the Royal Solomon's Islands Police Constabulary or the 
Paramilitary Force. The rebel forces and police officers were to surrender weapons and 
demilitarise Guadalcanal and other provinces. A Peace Monitoring Council was given the 
task of administering the agreement with assistance from an International Peace 
Monitoring Team. 
13 The Emergency Powers (Islands of Guadalcanal) Regulations 1999 of 14 June 1999 and amendments of 28 June 1999. 
14 The Panatina Agreement (12 August 1999) 3. <http://conunerce.govt.gov.sb/Ministries/Beneath_ 
Guadalcanal_3 .htm> (last accessed 9 September 2001 Available at 
<http://commerce.govt.gov. sb/Ministries/Beneath _Guadalcanal_ 3 .htm> (last accessed 9 September 2001 .) 15 The Solomon Islands Constitution uses the term ' disciplined forces ' to refer to the police. paramilitary police and prison service. 
16 " Solomon Islands: A forgotten conflict" (7 September 2000) Amnesry International, 9. 
<http.://www.web.amnesty.org/ai .nsi/index/ASA430052000> (last viewed 18 August 2001). 17 The Guadalcanal Agreement (22 February 2000) 6. <http://commerce.govt.gov.sb/Ministries/Beneath_ Guadalcanal_3.htm> (last accessed 9 September 2001). 18 TPA.. para 3(2). 
19 above. para 3(1). 
20 above. para 3(3). 
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Ill THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 AND ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS OF 1977 
A. Background 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) drafted the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions in response to the atrocities of WWII and following the Nuremberg trials. 
The First, Second and Third Geneva Conventions of 1949 expanded on existing law in 
relation to the sick and wounded in the armed forces or at sea or shipwrecked, and 
prisoners of war. They extended the protections and classes of persons protected, and 
improved the devices for implementation and enforcement. The Fourth Geneva 
Convention of the same year broke new ground by spelling out the rights of civilians 
during war. 
In essence, the Conventions lay down specific rules for protecting combatants 
who are sick, wounded or taken as prisoners of war, and for civilians who are not taking 
part in the hostilities. The Conventions number 317 articles, some of which are common 
to all four Conventions. 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions apply, with the exception of Article 3 common to 
all four Conventions, to international conflicts, that is, armed conflicts between two or 
more of the "High Contracting Parties", or an occupation of a state by another state. 
Article 3 provided minimum standards of humane treatment to conflicts simply referred 
to as "non-international conflicts" by prohibiting certain actions against those not actively 
involved in the hostilities. 
Additional Protocols I and II were added to the Conventions in 1977. Protocol I 
recognised national struggles for self-determination against racist regimes, alien 
occupation and colonial domination as international conflicts and Protocol II provided 
additional protections for internal conflicts of a certain intensity. The new Protocol II 
definition means there are four types of internal armed conflicts, including those to which 
Protocol I apply. The various definitions leave room for debate as to their application to a 
particular conflict and as consequence, what, if any, provisions apply. 
B. Implementation and compliance 
The Conventions include a variety of measures intended to ensure compliance 
with the provisions in international conflicts which are absent from the provisions 
applicable to internal conflicts. In particular they define more serious breaches as "grave 
breaches" and impose a duty on states to prosecute individuals responsible for those 
breaches. 
Grave breaches can be prosecuted by any of parties to the Conventions regardless 
of the nationality of the perpetuator or the location of the crime. States are required to 
enact legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for person(s) committing 
or ordering the committing of grave breaches, search for persons alleged to have 
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committed or ordered the commission of grave breaches and, try such persons before 
their national courts, or hand them over to another contracting state that has made out a 
prima facie case. 
Some states have enacted legislation to allow prosecutions of serious violations of 
Article 3 committed in territories other than their-own despite the lack of a duty to do 
so.21 The two ad-hoe International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and Rwanda (ICTR), were given jurisdiction to prosecute crimes in internal conflicts22 
and the ICC will also have jurisdiction to prosecute serious violations of Article 3. In 
addition, breaches will often be able to be prosecuted within the state they occurred, 
without recourse to international law, under the state's domestic criminal provisions. 
However, the lack of a duty to prosecute breaches in internal conflicts means perpetuators 
are more likely to escape punishment as states may be unable or unwilling to prosecute 
and relatively few conflicts will attract the international attention that led to the ICTY and 
ICTR being set up. 
C Characterisation of conflict 
The attempts to extend humanitarian law after WWII to cover armed conflicts 
regardless of whether they are characterised as international or internal has been 
hampered by the notion of state sovereignty, that is, what states do within their own 
territories is governed by their laws and is not a proper subject of international law. It was 
not in the interests of states and state sovereignty to recognise that humanitarian law 
applied to conflicts within their territory. They recognised that applying international 
rules may have the effect of legitimising movements against states and provide the 
individuals involved with more favourable treatment than criminals or traitors. For 
example, a prisoner of war is entitled to be released at the end of hostilities, a criminal is 
not. It has also been suggested that liberation movements have everything to gain by 
being recognised in this way, in that they are usually the weaker party. Restrictions on the 
conduct of armed conflict, and protections for civilians on whom they often depend, 
would be in their interest rather than the states, whose resources and power would be 
restricted. 23 
The ICRC attempted to have the Conventions apply to all armed conflicts 
regardless of type. In the end, Article 3 listed minimum humanitarian protections in all 
armed conflicts to persons not actively taking part in hostilities. It includes civilians and 
members of armed forces who are no longer taking part in hostilities. It requires these 
people to be treated humanely without discrimination, and prohibits specific acts, 
including the right to due process before any sentence or execution. This extension 
21 Thomas Graditzky "Individual criminal responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in non-international armed conflicts." (1998) 322 IRRC 29, 35. Legislation passed in Belgium 
in 1993 is described as the most innovative. 
22 ICTY Article 5 and ICTR Article 4-. 
23 Antonio Cassese "Wars of national liberation and humanitarian law" in Studies and essays in 
international humanitarian law and Red Cross principles in honour of Jean Pictet (International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva. 1984) 314. 
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reflects the 20th century trend to guarantee fundamental human rights that cannot be 
derogated from by the State. A glimmer of the desire to have the law extended can be 
seen in paragraph 3 of Article 3, "The parties to the [non-international armed] conflict 
should further endeavor to bring into force by means of special agreements, all or part of 
the other provisions of the present Convention". Naturally, the prospect of a state or other 
armed force making such an agreement with an adversary with less power while involved 
in armed conflict is minimal. 
Non-international conflict was deliberately not defined; another indication of 
states' reluctance to allow international law to apply to conflicts that challenged their 
authority, legitimacy and/or existence. Article 3 also specified that application of these 
minimum humanitarian principles had no effect on the status of the parties. This meant 
the state could still treat participants as criminals, and application of the Convention did 
not mean internal dissidents would gain international status or legitimacy for their cause. 
The push to expand the applicability of the Conventions to non-international 
conflicts co~tinued as internal conflicts caused intensive and large-scale destruction. In 
1968, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General by resolution to investigate 
the possibility of new conventions to better protect victims of war. 24 
The move to include certain types of internal conflicts came predominantly from 
Third World and socialist countries; they managed to have the first session of the 1974-
1977 Geneva Diplomatic Conference adopt a provision equating laws of national 
liberation with international conflicts. The final vote in 1977 led to a provision in 
Protocol I including armed conflicts "in which peoples are fighting against colonial 
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in their exercise of their right 
to self-determination,"25 as international armed conflicts.26 
Protocol II extended the protections available in internal armed conflicts. 
However, it did not merely extend the protections in Article 3 to all non-international 
conflicts, but defined a type of conflict to which the additional protections would apply. 
The ICRC's draft took into account views expressed in the earlier diplomatic conferences 
and was intended to provide objective criteria to determine when a non-international 
armed conflict existed. However, the end result was a compromise between groups that 
wished for a very high threshold of applicability and those at the other end of the 
spectrum. 27 The Pakistani amendment to the ICRC draft, requiring a high level of 
intensity, was the definition eventually accepted.28 
24 G.I.A.D. Draper "TI1e Development of Humanitarian Law of War" in International Dimensions of 
Humanitarian law (Henry Dunant Institute, Geneva. 1988) 67, 83 . 25 Article 1, para 4. 
26 Antonio Cassese, above. 317. 
27 Arturo Carrillo-Suarez "Hors de Logique: Contemporary Issues in International Humanitarian Law as 
Applied in Internal Armed Conflicts" (1999) 15 Am. U. Int'L Rev. 1, 76. 
28 Georges Abi-Saab "Non-International Armed Conflicts" International Dimensions of Humanitarian law 
(Henry Dunant Institute, Geneva, 1988), 217, 229. 
9 
It expressly did not modify the ex1stmg conditions of Article 3 which meant 
Article 3 protections still applied to the undefined "non-international conflicts" and 
Protocol II's additional protections only applied to internal conflicts which met the 
criteria. Protocol II' s applicability is defined in Article 1 (2) as: 
• conflicts not covered by Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, that is, conflicts 
between states, 
• conflicts not covered by Protocol I, which defined wars against colonialism and racist 
regimes as international in character, 
• armed conflicts which take place in the territory of a state between its armed forces 
and dissident armed forces or other organised armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of a territory as to enable them to carry 
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol, 
• conflicts not characterised as "situations of internal disturbances and tensions such as 
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other such acts of a similar nature" . 
Protocol II' s definition is commonly described in the literature as having a high 
threshold of applicability and being akin to a full-blown civil war. For example, 29 
"Protocol II ... only applies to those conflicts that have reached the scale and 
intensity of the classical civil war,_ i..e. where two or more political authorities_ 
with virtually de-facto governmental authority in their respective territorial 
areas of control are engaged in. arrned conflict with organised forces under 
effective command." 
and "A very high threshold triggers the application of Protocol II. The Protocol applies 
to situations at or near the scale of a full-scale civil war.30 
The threshold of applicability is criticised as a barrier to protecting v1ct1ms of 
internal wars . While it is clear that it only applies to conflicts of a certain intensity, 
Arturo Carrillo-Suarez makes a convincing argument, with reference to the drafting 
history and plain words of the definition, that this. common description puts the threshold 
of applicability higher than can be justified. 31 He quotes the Canadian delegation view of 
the vote as a summary of this issue:32 
Like any compromise, the text is subject to certain interpretations not always of 
the san1e nature. Some delegations argue that because of the nwnber of 
qualifications contained in it, only conflicts of a very high threshold such as 
civil wars are covered. Othei:s- underline that these qualifications are a 
reflection of the factual and practical circumstances that would in fact have to 
be exist if a Party to- the conflict Gould be expected- to implement the provisions 
of the Protocol. Furthermore we do not agree that this necessarily means they 
could exist only in civil war situations. 
29 G.I.A.D. Draper "The Development of Humanitarian Law of War'' in International Dimensions of 
Humanitarian Law (Henry Dunant Institute, Geneva, 1988) 67, 84. 
3°Theodore Meron," The Humanization of Humanitarian Law" (2000) 94 Am J lnt ' l L 239, 261. 31 Arturo CarrilJo-Suarez. (1999), as above, 67-8-9. 
32 Arturo Carrillo-Suarez,( 1999), as above, 78. 
One definition of a civil war is: 33 
Civil war, of all internal armed conflicts originating at the heart of the State, is 
the one most characterised by the widespread division of civil society and the 
military confrontation of one or more groups as well as being qualified by a 
certain duration of the conflict, the intensity of the military operations, the 
open character of the hostilities, the size and organisation of the armed groups 
and, finally, the -dominion oveF a sizeable [notable] and significant part of the 
national territory. 
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Distinctions may be made between a civil war and one to which Protocol II may also 
apply. For example, 
• where control over territory is not sizeable (but sufficient to carry out sustained 
military operations and to implement the Protocol), 
• less division in civil society, 
• smaller armed groups, 
• a conflict of less duration and possibly, 
• where the rebel group(s) does not assume, or aim for, powers of the State. 
Protocol II also differs from Article 3 in that one of the parties to the conflict must 
be the state, that is the armed forces of the High Contracting Party. 
Protocol II Article 1 (2) excludes "situations. of internal disturbance and tensions. 
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence"34 as not being armed conflicts. This 
was initially drafted to define and restrict the meaning of non-international conflicts, 
(when the intention was to extend Article 3 protections. without creating a new category 
of internal conflicts), but survived in the same form in Protocol II. 35 In the context of 
Protocol II, it has little meaning as such situations would clearly be ruled out by its field 
of applicab-il-ity but its inclusion- was- wanted by some to restrict the ambit of common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 36 Any effect on Article 3 is debatable as the first 
paragraph of Article 1 specifies it does not modify the existing conditions of Article 3. 
However most writers accept suGh. s.ituations would implicitly not be covered by Article 
3.37 Drawing on an ICRC explanation3g- of this term, Robert Goldman39 gives examples 
of such situations as riots or demonstrations without a concerted plan from the outset, 
sporadic acts of violence as opposed to military operations carried out by armed forces, 
33 Mangos Martin "Conflictos Armados lnternos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario'' (1990). cited in 
Arturo Carrillo-Suarez, (1999), as above, 80. 
34 Article I, para 2. 
35 ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols of8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
19./9 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Geneva, 1987) 1354. 
36 Georges Abi-Saab "Non-International Armed Conflicts" International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law 
(Henry Dunant Institute, Geneva, 1988), 217, 229. 
37 For example see Theodore Meron, " The Humanization of Humanitarian Law" (2000) 94 Am J Int'l L 
239,261 "Conflicts involving lower intensity violence ... are implicitly distinguished form armed conflicts''; 38 "Protection and Assistance Activities in Situations Not Covered by International Humanitarian Law" 
(1988) 262 IRRC 9,13. 
39 Robert Goldman" Americas Watch' s fa.'perience in Monitoring Internal Armed Conflicts" (1993) 9 Am 
U J Int'L & Pol'y 49, 54. 
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and serious states of tensions that result in large-scale arrests, suspension of fundamental 
guarantees, states of emergencies that are a sequel to an armed conflict. 
The approach of the Conventions and Protocols to characterisation of conflict is 
losing some of its significance as other areas of international humanitarian law have 
developed. 40 The appeal chamber of the ICTY said in Tadic41 that the distinction 
between international and non-international conflicts was losing its value in relation to 
human beings due to the development of human rights doctrines. 
However, there remains four categories of internal armed conflicts and 
characterisation can still effect, particularly in relation to international prosecution for 
breaches, the purpose of protecting victims of war. The various definitions can be 
difficult to apply; they are not all mutually exclusive and leave room for debate as to if 
and when they apply. The distinction between a Protocol I and Protocol II conflict 
depends on the view taken of the legitimacy and reasons for the attack on the 
government. Article 3 will apply to conflicts that do not reach the threshold of a Protocol 
II definition and what may be excluded as being a situation of "internal disturbances and 
tensions" may progress to a non- international armed conflict (Article 3) and further to a 
Protocol ll type armed conflict. The applicability of Protocol II can be further debated 
depending on whether it is viewed as requiring something akin to a classic civil war. 
The specific elements of the Protocol II definition are discussed further in relation 
to the Solomon Island conflict as are the provisions of the Conventions and Protocols that 
apply depending on characterisation of the conflict. 
IV APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
TO THE SOLOMON ISLANDS CONFLICT 
A. Solomon Islands' national legislation and international law 
The Solomon Islands acceded to the Conventions and Protocols I and II by 
succession in July 1981, with retrospective effect to 7 July 1978, the date of 
independence. The retention of the laws of the United Kingdom, until other provision is 
made, resulted in the Solomon Islands inheriting the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 (UK) 
which implements the 1949 Conventions. While lack of implementation of international 
humanitarian law into national law is often cited as a barrier to its effectiveness, this is 
not the case in the Solomon Islands. To a large extent, the Constitution, Penal Code, and 
40 For example see Theodore Meron. " The Humanization of Humanitarian Law" (2000) 94 Am J lnt'l L 
239, 261. He points to the trend to blur the applicability of the Conventions regardless of the 
characterisation of the conflict. He notes the 1997 ICRC study on the rules of customary humanitarian law 
makes only a basic distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts, rather than 
adopting the approach of the Conventions and Protocols. He also notes that most military manuals do not 
distinguish between types of conflict 
41 The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic (Decision of2 October 1995 in case No IT-94-l-AR72) 35 ILM [1996] 
para 97. 
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legislation perm1ttmg extradition implement the Conventions and other international instruments protecting human rights. 42 The law makes specific references to international obligations, and the Interpretation Act provides for interpretation of legislation in a manner consistent with international obligations. 
The Constitution recognises a state of war in Article 4 ''Protection of Right to Life" by providing an exception to the right to not be deprived of life in clause (2)( d), "If he dies as the result of a lawful act of war." The Constitution provides for the Governor General to make a declaration of public emergency in Article 15(5), and Article 16(1) includes war as a period of public emergency. Article 15 (7) deems actions taken in a period of public emergency, that are "reasonably justified in the circumstances of any situation arising or existing during the period" not to be inconsistent with, or in contravention of, the rights contained in section 5, 6(2), 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, or 15 of the Constitution. These are the rights to: 
• personal liberty, 
• not to be required to perform forced labour, 
• of privacy of home and other property, 
• freedom of conscience and expression, 
• freedom of assembly and association, 
• freedom of movement, and 
• freedom from discrimination. 
These fundamental human rights are relevant to situations of internal conflict as they apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions and in times of other internal armed conflicts. The Constitution reflects the rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Convenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) including the escape clause in Article 4 of the ICCPR which permits certain derogations from rights in times of public emergency. In addition, the protections in the Constitution reflect fundamental human rights, some of which are recognised to apply as jus cogens, that is,_ are so fundamental that they cannot be derogated from by state and can apply whether or not a state has ratified a treaty or conventions and/or implemented legislation. The international crime of genocide is recognised in Section 52 of the Penal Code. 
The Solomon Islands signed the Rome Statute on 3 December 1998 but has as yet ratified it. At the time of writing the writer has been unable to ascertain the government's intentions to ratify or implement the Rome Statute. 
B Characterisation of Conflict in the Solomon Islands 
Several aspects of the conflict in the Solomon Islands reflect the difficulties in characterising an internal conflict as being of a particular kind. As there was no 
42 This statement is an assumption based on the retention of UK law until other provision is made, and provisions in the Constitution. It has not proved possible to access current versions of all the relevant legislation. 
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involvement of other states the conflict is clearly not an international one within the 
meaning of the 1949 Conventions. Nor would it be covered by Protocol I, as the 
Solomon Islands government is not a colonial one, nor is it an occupied country or a 
racist regime. 
I Armed conflict 
The first threshold to be passed for the Conventions or Protocol II to apply is 
whether the conflict is an armed conflict. This requires there to be at least two opposing 
armed forces and the use of, or threat of, force or violence by at least one party to impose 
its will on the other.43 In the Solomon Islands this point could be said to have been 
reached once the GRA established itself as an organised force and used force or the threat 
of force to achieve its goals. The GRA emerged after a series of non-violent 
demonstrations?" then riots by ethnic Guale and actions by armed groups of ethnic Guale 
on the island of Guadalcanal. -In 1998, the Guadalcanal militants were estimated . to 
number 500,. and by the joint UN Assessment Mission between 300 and 2000 in 1999.44 
They were r~putedly armed with hunting rifles, stolen police guns, explosives, traditional 
weapons and home-made pipe guns. 45 While force was used by to evict ethnic Malaitian 
before the establishment of the GRA, the concept of armed conflict requires some degree 
of an organised or recognisable force with a goal contrary to that of the established order 
to distinguish it from ordinary criminal activity using force. 
However, while the formation of the GRA seems to be a point at which the 
conflict could be called an armed conflict within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions, 
it is clearly open to debate. The language of the government in the various peace 
agreements and declarations of emergency a year later, refers to "organisations formed 
for the purposes of pushing the demands of the people of Guadalcanal" and "criminal 
activities" as opposed to the name adopted by the group. The earlier peace agreements 
were negotiated with elected representatives of the Guadalcanal population as a whole 
rather than the Guale militants. While the government gave no formal statement of its 
view of the situation, the language suggests a 'playing down' of the situation to one 
below that of an internal war. The early peace agreements use the words "recent 
tensions". However, the activities of the Guale forces, which are acknowledged in the 
same documents, were more cohesive and extensive than 'riots, isolated and sporadic acts 
of violence' suggest. The Guale force had directly and indirectly caused thousands of 
Malaitan citizens to leave the island by that stage and the government's armed force had 
lost control of most of the rural areas. While the definitions were intended to provide 
objective criteria, a government with an interest in appearing to have control of the 
situation can present a conflict as less than an internal armed conflict. 
2 Parties to the conflict 
43 Richard Baxter "The Law of The Hague"" International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law (Henry 
Dunant Institute, Geneva, 1988), 93 , 94. 
44 Report on the UN Joint Assessment Mission to the Solomon Islands, 29 June-3 July 1999, para 7. 45 "Solomon Islands: A forgotten conflict", as above, p 3. 
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Before the establishment of the pro-Malaitan force, the armed police units and the IFM, and its predecessors, were the parties to the conflict. From the passing of the emergency regulations, ordinary police officers, who were not normally armed became entitled to be armed in addition to the two armed units. Armed police are within the meaning of the armed force of the state. 
Unlike Article 3, for Protocol II to apply, one of the parties to the conflict must be the armed force of the state. While armed police were certainly involved, the extent and to what point in time, they functioned as an agent of the state, can be questioned Once the MEF emerged, the state's armed forces had no semblance of being a united force engaged in hostilities against the IFM. The lack of a united armed force at this stage of the conflict, may mean,_ the Protocol,. if applicable before, became inapplicable. In earlier drafts, the ICRC envisaged the Protocol should still apply if the government had disappeared, or was too weak to intef\lene, but "it appeared to the Conference that this was merely a textbook example and the provision was dropped.',46 
Althc;>Ugh the state was ostensibly still functioning, individual officers were openly siding with the IFM or Malaitan vigilante groups or ineffective. The police's lack of success in controlling the situation should not logically be a reason to discount the applicability of Protocol II. The Multinational Police Monitoring Group, present from October 1999 to June 2000, left after the coup on the basis they had no mandate to assist the police units who were then formally working with the MEF. However, from the period of the coup to the signing of the TP A, it could be argued that the armed forces of the state were again engaged in the hostilities with the IFM, given the paramilitary force, acted in conjunction with the MEF. 47 The view as to whether they were agents of the state may also depend on views of the legitimacy of the party in power to govern. Conversely, in the confused political scene, its quite possible that the paramilitary force began acting as an undisclosed agent of the government, the new Prime Minister gained his position due to the MEF and the paramilitaries ' actions in forcing his predecessor' s resignation. 
A more objective approach to this question is to simply ask whether the police, as the armed force of the state, were involved in the conflict, using force against one or more other armed groups, note that they used state resources, continued to be paid and employed as officers rather than analyse the legitimacy of their actions. Such an approach would lead to the conclusion that it was a conflict between the armed forces of the state and other armed groups. 
3 Degree of intensity required for Protocol II to apply 
A major difficulty in deciding applicability of Protocol II is the degree of intensity required. If one was to accept that Protocol II only applied to only classical civil war 
46 Yves Sandoz & Others (ed), above, (1987) 1351. 47 The MEF announced the operations as those of the joint force of MEF /paramilitary operation. See Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Solomon Islands Country Brief, (May 2001) 3. http://dfat.gov.au/geo/Solomon_Islands_brief.htm (last accessed 8 August 2001 
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situations, it would be hard to view this conflict as being within the definition. 
Guadalcanal, while the most populated and important politically and economically, is only one of nine provinces in the Solomon Islands with about 25% of the total 
population. The IFM's control over Guadalcanal was substantial in area and duration but if the whole populated area of the Solomons is considered, far less substantial. The 
civilian population could not be described as being widely divided, again as the conflict was confined to Guadalcanal, and even along ethnic lines, there was not widespread 
approval, support or identification with the militant groups. The numbers actively involved in the two ethnic armed forces probably numbered less than four thousand at the 
peak of the conflict. Neither the IFM nor the :MEF stated that they aimed to overthrow the state government. The IFM grievances surrounded the position of Guale people on their 
home islands in relation to land and in relation to the economic and social position 
Malaitans have gained on their island. The :MEF was formed to protect Malaitans from 
the IFM. At best the IFM wanted more control and autonomy on Guadalcanal, rather than aiming to overthrow the national government. 
Analysing the conflict in terms of the actual and ordinary meaning of Article 1 
can lead to quite a different result. The control over territory required is not specified in size or duration, but by the ability to carry out the listed functions, that is, sustained and 
concerted military operations and to implement the Protocol. "[S]everal proposals were 
made with a view to specifying the { type and size J of control but they were not adopted by the Conference. The word "such" provides the key to the interpretation."48 The issue is then the degree of co-ordination, organisation and continuity of the military effort. The 
only clearly identified military objective was to remove Malaitan people from Guadalcanal. The IFM also 'defended' itself and other Guale citizens by attacking and 
killing Malaitan civilians and opposing combatants in reprisal attacks whenever they 
were attacked which contributed to the climate of fear; many Malaitan left through fear of 
attack, rather than being forcibly removed. 
\ 
Malaitans fled Guadalcanal over a period of a year and a half In that period, and in the months after the TP A was signed, there was no period in which IFM control lapsed 
to the extent that Malaitans stopped leaving or returned from Malaita or Honiara to their homes. Forty per cent of civilians. in Guadalcanal were displaced, half to Malaita, and the 
rest within Guadalcanal. 49 Throughout the conflict, the militant groups set up roadblocks and were able to control the movement of people and services, including relief provided 
by the Red Cross. 
In that time, police and later :MEF, control was limited to the capital, Honiara; the only area outside IFM control was a small province, Marau, the only other Malaitan 
enclave on Guadalcanal. The IFM worked in small groups, visiting villages to round up Malaitans by gunpoint. The commentary to the Article 1 states " In practical terms ... the 
48 Yves Sandoz & Others (ed) Commentary on the A dditional Protocols of 8 June 1987 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Geneva, 1987) 1352. 
49 "£:.q:>erts Group Meeting on the Post Conflict Situation in the Solomon Islands."(19-20 October 2000) Session III, 2. <http://www.peoplefirst.nct.sb/General/Reports/Experts _Group_ 2.htm> (last accessed 18 September 2001). 
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extent of territory they can claim to control will be that which escapes the control of the 
government forces. "50 There is no information as to the planning and organisation of the 
IFM activities, but, judged by results, the IFM effort was concerted and continuous. 
4 Responsible command 
The dissident forces also have to be under responsible command. According to 
the commentary on Protocol II this simply implies some degree of organisation, but not 
necessarily a hierarchical system of military organisation similar to regular armed forces, 
but in addition to planning and carrying out military operations, of imposing discipline. 51 
The IFM clearly had a command structure, four regional supreme commanders 
represented it at the TP A negotiations and others listed as chief spokesperson/negotiator, 
commanders and assistant commanders, who all signed the agreement as parties or 
witnesses. At one stage the Government treated the leader of the Guadalcanal Provincial 
Government, Premier Ezebiel Alebua as representing IFM interests. 52 However, Amnesty 
International. reported that members of the IFM were generally unaware of the Honiara 
Peace Accord negotiated on their behalf by the Premier Alebua. 53 It may be that 
leadership was unclear at that stage, or simply that it was not prudent for the leaders to be 
identified publicly. If Premier Alebua was acting on behalf of the IFM, or any of its 
organised predecessors, the lack of awareness of the Honiara Accord suggests the 
leadership of the IFM was not sufficiently organised to ensure members were aware of its 
provisions. However, this fragment of information does not establish the case either way; 
there may have been a responsible command structure in existence at an earlier stage. 
The lack of information as to the internal workings of the IFM during the conflict, mean 
it is not possible to analyse the ability of the leadership to impose discipline on the 
members. After the TP A was signed, the leadership structure stayed in place, but 
ostensibly, the members or former members, were no longer under control, refusing in 
some instances to return weapons despite calls by leaders to do so. 
5. Ability to implement provisions 
The ability to implement the Protocol is a fundamental criterion The Protocol II 
definition includes "the ability to implement its provisions" . It has been suggested that 
the armed forces must be able to carry out, among other things, the requirements of 
Protocol .II, such as detaining pi-isoners and caring for the wounded and sick before 
Protocol II applies. 54 It is unlikely that either rebel group had sufficient resources of their 
own (given the lack of resources in the country as a whole) to care for their or the other 
parties' sick and wounded, or to detain prisoners in humane conditions for any length of 
50 Yves Sandoz & Others (ed), above. 1987) 1353 . 
51 Yves Sandoz & Others (ed). above. 1987) 1352. 
52 Premier Alebua negotiated the Honiara Peace Accord on behalf of the IFM and Guale people. 53 "Solomon Islands: A forgotten conflict", as above. 3. 
54Robert Kogod Goldman "International Humanitarian Law and the Armed Conflicts in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua" 2 Am U J Int'l L & Pol 'y 539, 547 (1987) p59. 
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time. However, the armed forces made use of the public resources such as hospitals and 
clinics for the wounded. If they had the ability to take the sick and wounded to places 
where they could be cared for, that should be sufficient to meet part of the criteria if the 
actual circumstances and resources of the country as a whole are taken into account. 
Civilians and militants were detained at various times, but not kept as prisoners 
except by the State. The fact that prisoners were not held for any length of time should 
not rule out the applicability of the Protocol II. If the ability to implement is interpreted to 
exclude situations where certain provisions of the Protocol II were not implemented, for 
example, by killing rather than imprisoning civilians and unarmed combatants, it would 
lead to the absurd situation of the Protocol being inapplicable to any situation where it 
was not applied. This definition suggests the rebel armed forces, should have sufficient 
infrastructure and resources and on the face of it, does not allow for the ability to 
implement to be applied relative to the conditions present in undeveloped and 
economically disadvantaged states. 
5 Special agreements 
Article 3 includes provision for the parties to an internal conflict to "bring into 
force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the provisions of the present 
Convention." Various parties to the conflict concluded four agreements prior to the 
cease-fire of September 2000. Given these agreements were intended to stop the conflict, 
it is not surprising they did not include provisions agreeing to abide by the Conventions 
in the event the conflict continued. 
6. Summary of applicability discussion 
Aspects of three of the four types of internal armed conflict can be seen during 
the Solomon Islands conflict. The earlier stages have the appearance of internal 
disturbances and tensions but determining when it progressed from one stage to the next 
is difficult. In addition, while an objective view of the conflict suggests Article 3 applied 
from the formations of the Guale armed groups until the signing of the TP A, the 
government response midway through the conflict, indicated by its statements, suggests a 
<:ituation less than an armed conflict. During the period prior to the collapse of the armed 
police and the IFM' s actions in forcibly relocating large numbers of Malaitans it has all 
the hallmarks of a Protocol II conflict, although its ability to implement the Protocol can 
be questioned due to the likely lack of resources, particularly in regards to holding of 
prisoners in humane conditions. 
Amnesty International clearly took the view that humanitarian law as it applies to 
internal conflicts applied to this situation, referring to specific breaches of the provisions 
of Article 3 and provisions only applicable to Protocol II throughout its report.55 This is 
the only substantial report on the conflict and has been used as a basis for the Australian 
55 "Solomon Islands: A forgotten conflict" (7 September 2000) Amnesty International. 9. 
<http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsi/index/ASAB0052000> (last viewed 18 August 2001). 
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and United States human rights reports on the conflict. 56 However, the report makes no 
attempt to analyse the conflict in terms of the type of conflict or which provisions were 
applicable at various times. 
B. Protections Provided by Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and by Additional 
Protocol II 
Article 3 provides for minimum humanitarian provisions for "armed conflicts that 
are not of an international character." It follows the general principles of the Conventions 
by providing protections to those taking no part in hostilities, the armed forces who have 
laid down their arms or are sick or wounded, and civilians. Acts prohibited under 
subsection (1) are: 
(a) violence, to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages, 
( c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and cruel punishment, 
( d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without [proper trial] . 
Subsection (2) requires the wounded and sick to be collected and cared for. 
Protocol II reaffirmed and expanded on the protections provided in Article 3. 
There are 14 articles giving general and specific guarantees to those not taking part in 
hostilities, children, civilians, medical and religious personnel , objects required by 
civilians for survival, and forced movement of civilians. Those not taking part in 
hostilities are entitled to respect and to be treated humanely without adverse distinction. 
Acts generally covered by Article 3 and specifically prohibited by Protocol II are: 
(a) violence to life, health and physical or mental treatment such as torture, 
mutilation or any form of corporal punishment, 
(b) collective punishments, 
( c) taking of hostages, 
(d) acts of terrorism, 
( e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault, 
(t) slavery, and the slave tr<!de in all forms, 
(g) pillage, and 
(h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts. 57 
Specific protections for children include care and aid as well as rece1vmg an 
education, facilitating the reunion of families separated and removing children from areas 
where hostilities are taking part. Children under 15 are not to be recruited into the armed 
56 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Solomon Islands Country Brief (May 2001) 3. 
<http://dfat.gov.au/geo/Solomon_Islands_briefhtm > (last accessed 8 August 2001 and US Department of 
State. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practises - Solomon Islands" (2000). Available at 
<http://www.State.gov>. 
57 Protocol II Article 4 (2). 
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forces or allowed to take part, and if they do take part, they are to be afforded the same protections if captured as children who do not take part. 58 Particular protections for civilians include to be protected from the dangers arising from military operations and, in 
particular, not to be the object of attack or acts or threats of violence intended to spread terror. 59 
If Protocol II applies to the Solomon Islands conflict, the number and types of breaches by the various groups would be higher than under Article 3. Article 17 of the Protocol prohibits forced movement of civilians unless for their security or due to a military imperative. If displacements are necessary, alt possible measures are to be taken to ensure their shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition. 60 There is a general prohibition on compelling civilians to leave their own territory. 61 In terms of effect, the prohibition against the forced movement of civilians, only included by Protocol II, is the most significant. 
The main activities of the GRA and the IFM were to force civilian Malaitans to leave Guada~canal. It appears that the political objectives to resolve longstanding land issues and to improve the economic situation of the ethnic Guale people translated into the military obj_ective of ridding the island of Malaitans. There was certainly no attempt 
to ensure that those fleeing the island to Malaita were received in satisfactory conditions. 
The general requirement for humane treatment without adverse distinction in Article 3 would mean that lack of humane treatment targeted at ethnic Malaitans or ethnic Guadalcanal civilians, because of their ethnicity, would also prohibited under Article 3. 
Amnesty International has documented many breaches of Article 3 and Protocol II protections by members of the police acting in their official capacity and as members of either of the armed military groups, as well as members of the two main factions, the NIEF and the IFM. Their report, Solomon Islands: A forgotten conflict, was compiled after the two-person delegation, Dr. Heinz Schurmann-Zeggel from Amnesty International in London and Reverend Akuil Yabaki, from Citizens ' Constitutional Watchdog, a Fiji-based NGO, investigated human rights abuses. They arrived in the Solomon Islands in September 1999.61 The following examples are provided to establish that all parties to the conflict violated the provisions of Article 3 and Protocol II. 
• Police acting in their official capacity, before and after the passing of the emergency 
regulations were implicated in the fatal shooting of non-combatants,63 
58 As above. Article 4(3 ). 
59 As above. Article 13 . 
60 As above Article 17(1). 
61 As above. Article 17(2). 
62 Anmestv International media release. 8 September 1999. AI index ASA 43/01/99. 63 " Solom~n Islands: A forgotten conflict" (7 September 2000) Amnesty International. 9. 
<http. ://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsi/index/ASA430052000> (last viewed 18 August 2001) 9. 
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indiscriminately firing at villagers64 and ill treatment of prisoners and suspected 
militant Guadalcanal youths. 65 
• The MEF was accused of. threatening nursing staff-at -the hospital in Honiara and 
shooting two wounded members.. of the IFM in their beds66 and shooting at civilian 
patients at a rural health clinic in Vi sale, killing a 16-year-old and an elderly man. 67 
In April 2000 there was a report of masked MEF gunmen killing a civilian and 
injuring two others as they tried to flee the gunmen, and in June 2000, a report of 
indiscriminate shooting at civilian targets.6&-
• The GRA killed two civilians while in the process of forcing all ethnic Malaitans to 
leave an oil plantation settlement. One of the men was.. trying to protect his child in 
his arms; she was injured but survived the attack.6"" 
• Torture, ill treatment and hostage taking of civilians and combatants were also 
reported. Some specific incidents were reputedly revenge for civilians harmed by the . l 10 nva group. 
• Red Cross official and . volunteers.. were intermittently prevented by the :rvt:EF from 
taking medical supplies and food to people in rural Guadalcanal. 71 
F The situation of police officers 
Actions undertaken by police while employed by the State raise considerations 
additional to breaches of Article 3 and Protocol II. Abuses by police against general 
human rights provisions are enforceable against the State. In addition, for the purpose of 
promoting and protecting human rights, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution 72 
establishing a code of conduct for law enforcement officials. 73 The resolution 
recommends the code of conduct be used within the framework of national legislation or 
practice as a body of principles for observance by law enforcement officials. 74 Officers of 
the Solomon Islands police force have received training locally and overseas on human 
rights standards and on the provisions. in the co<le o.f conduct relating to the use o.f 
firearms and force .
75 
The ICRC also conducted at least one seminar on international 
humanitarian law and the human rights law applicable to armed conflicts during the 
period of the conflict.76 
64 
above. 10. Reports from women ofTakamboro. 
65 above. 9. 
66 above, 12. 
67 
above, 12. 
68 above, 14. 
69 above, 13. 
70 
above. 18 
71 
above. 20. 
72 
UN General Assembly Resolution 34/169 adopted 17 December. 1979. 
73 
Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials ( 1980) 19 ILM 526. 
74 
"Solomon Islands: A forgotten conflict", above. 2. 
75 
"Solomon Islands A forgotten conflict", above, 7. 
76 
"Solomon Islands A forgotten conflict" above. 7. 
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V AMNESTY FROM PROSECUTIONS FOR BREACHES OF 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 
A Background 
Despite the two militant groups and the police force committing a whole range of 
humanitarian and human rights abuses that breached Article 3 and Protocol II, the TP A 
gave all involved in the conflict an amnesty. This included amnesty for all involved from 
criminal prosecutions and civil suit in exchange for surrendering firearms and returning 
stolen property. Police and paramilitary police were permitted to continue their 
employment. 
Amnesty International called the passing of the Amnesty Act in the Solomon 
Islands "a black day for human rights"77. 78 
Impunity for torture. rape and killing of civilians, including children. is an 
outrage and contributes oothing to peace m: reconciliation. Sweeping amnesties 
have not bought peace in other conflicts and are likely to cast a deep shadow 
on the future of human rights in the Solomon Islands. 
And reported in the Solomon Islands: 79-
A blanket amnesty for virtually all crimes and human rights abuses committed 
during the two-year ethnic war may encourage future political tortmers and 
killers to expect to get away with atrocities. Mr Asipara. press secretary to the 
Prime Minister said A.nulesty Elntemational] should ru1derstand that the Peace 
Agreement was negotiated from a Melanesian stand point of conflict resolution 
where compensation is paid to pave way for pardon and forgiveness . 
Amnesties for perpetuators of human rights abuses have been a feature of many 
peace agreements over recent years and show no signs of declining. Amnesties have been 
called the price for peace when granted in exchange for the ending of hostilities. If they 
provide peace and prevent further abuses, an amnesty may be better bargain for victims, 
present and potential, than prosecution and punishment, which in terms of prevention, 
can only work as a deterrent. While only time, and to an extent speculation,_ can 
determine the utility of the Solomon Islands amnesty, on the face of it and with the 
benefit of some experience of events subsequent to the TP A, it appears to be insufficient 
achieve its goals past the immediate one of halting hostilities. However, the amnesty was 
the most contentious part of the peace agreement, and without it there would have been 
77 "Amnesty - Asipara" (22 December 2000) Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation. Headline News 
<http://www.conunerce.gov. sb/Others/sibc _news_ Dec2000 .htm#fri 22> (last accessed 2 9 September 
2001). 
78 "Black Day of Human Rights" Amnesty International Press Release (19 December 2000). Available at 
<http://web.amnesty.org> (last accessed 22 August 2001). 
79 "Amnesty- Asipara", above. 
little incentive for the militants to cease hostilities. Had the conflict continued, there 
would have been no immediate prospect of the state regaining sufficient control of the 
police, or of the courts becoming effective to prevent further crimes and breacheS- of 
humanitarian law. 80 Although the Solomon Islands government received assistance from 
other states under the auspices of the Commonwealth, it was very unlikely that any 
assistance would have extended to providing armed forces to quell the militants and 
restore law and order to the Solomon Islands. 
Although the incidences of national and international criminal prosecutions 
resulting from actions in internal conflicts are on the increase, there is still no clear 
obligation on states to prosecute breaches in these conflicts. Without evidence of 
compliance, too few prosecutions and the prevalence of amnesties, humanitarian law 
appears to provide not much more than the utility of words to criticise those that breach it 
in internal wars, and give some additional legitimacy to the provision of humanitarian 
relief by neutral agencies 
B Appli{:ations of amnesties 
The term 'amnesty' refers to a state granting of immunity from criminal 
prosecution to people for offences committed. In this particular context, immunity 
includes prosecution for breaches of humanitarian law, whether contained in a state's 
criminal legislation or specific legislation designed to implement the conventions. 
Amnesties can be considered from several viewpoints, whether they comply with 
a state's international obligations, compliance with its own laws and in terms of utility . 
The immediate purpose is usually to stop hostilities in order to prevent further abuses. 
Other purposes can be to provide an alternative form of justice to prosecution with a 
focus on the rights of the victim, and to promote reconciliation within the state. 
Amnesties have been widely used as a tool to end hostilities in armed conflicts. 
In recent years amnesties have been granted in Papua New Guinea81 , Argentina, Chile, 
Guatemala82, Uruguay, Mozambique/J- Uganda, Zimbabwe, Republic of Congo/4 El 
80 "The police and prison service had disintegrated and the judiciary was completely dysfunctional. the magistrates had all left and the Director of Pubffc Prosecutions was living in fear." Experts Group Meeting on the Post Conflict Situation in the Solomon Islands" . Session Ill. 4. 
<http://www. peoplefirst. net. sb/General/Reports/Experts _Group_ 2. htm >(last accessed 18 September 2001). 81 Lincoln Agreement on Peace. Security and Development ofBougainville (1998) Clause 10 "Amnesty and Pardon". <http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/bougainville/png_ lincoln.htm> (last viewed 10 September 
2001). 
8
" Douglass Cassel "Accountability For International Crime And Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rigl1ts: Lessons from the Americas: Guidelines for International Response to Amnesties for Atrocities" (1996) 59 Law & Contemp. Probs. 197, 222 . 
83 US Department of State. "Cow1try Reports on Human Rigl1ts Practises - Mozambique" (1992). Available 
at http://www.State.gov>. 
84 US Department of State. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Republic of Congo" ( 1999). 
Available at http://wwv,.State.gov>. 
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Salvador, Haiti,85 South Africa86 and Sierra Leone. 87 Amnesties have been granted in a 
variety of circumstances and come in a variety of forms. In most cases amnesties are seen 
as a necessity, rather than a mechanism to allow deserving combatants relief from 
prosecution. However, amnesties are not always a complete escape from justice; some 
require the perpetuators of abuse to atone for their crimes and allow victims to receive 
some form of compensation for their losses. 
The Lome Accord negotiated at the end of eight years of civil war in Sierra Leone 
provided a complete amnesty for perpetuators of prolonged and systematic abuse of 
civilians. The Revolutionary Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) is known to have amputated 
limbs and mutilated civilians in a horrific campaign called "Operation No Living Thing". 
Rape of women and girls as well as abduction of children to join their forces was also 
widespread. While the Lome Accord peace agreement set up a Human Rights 
Commission and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate abuses and 
facilitate healing and reconciliation, the amnesty was. grant€d without any requirement for 
the former combatants to participate in either ofthoseprocesses.88 
This can be contrasted with the amnesty granted in South Africa by the first 
democratically elected government after the end of apartheid in 1995. Individuals had to 
apply for an amnesty and would only be granted it if they fully disclosed the facts of their 
h "d · 89 apart e1 cnmes. 
In Guatemala the amnesty negotiated in 1996 excluded genocide, torture, forced 
disappearances as well as any crimes for which. amnesty is prohibited under its domestic 
law or international law. 90 Under the American Convention on Human Rights, which 
applies to Guatemala, this has been interpreted to apply to serious violations of human · h 9 1 ng ts. 
The amnesty in the Solomon Islands provides for individual amnesties which are 
conditional on combatants, the police and their civilian advisors returning stolen weapons 
and property92 by a set date.93 There is no restriction on the type of crimes for which 
85 Michael P. Scharf " The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court" 
( 1999) 32 Cornell Int ' l L.J. 507.510. 
86 The South African Parliament created a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1995 that made 
amnesties available to individuals who applied and fully disclosed facts of their apartheid crimes. 87 Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra 
Leone July 7, 1999 ("The Lome Accord';. 
88 See Karen Gallagher "No Justice, No Peace: The Legalities and Realities of Anmesty in Sierra Leone., 
(2000) 23 T. Jefferson L. Rev. l-l9, 
89 Michael P. Scharf " The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court" 
(1999) 32 Cornell Int ' l L.J. 507,509. 
90 Douglass Cassel "Accountability For International Crime And Serious Violations of Fundamental 
Human Rights: Lessons from the Americas: Guidelines for International Response to Amnesties for 
Atrocities" ( 1996) 59 Law & Con temp. Probs. 197, 222. 
91 Douglass Cassel. as above. 223 . 
92 Anmestv Act 2000 (S.I.) s 3. 
93 The dat~ was set was 15 November 2000 in the TPA but at time of writing was extended to 30 September 
2001. 
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amnesty 1s given. The amnesty for the IFM is for any acts "in connection or in 
association with the forceful eviction for the Province in Guadalcanal of certain 
persons". 94 The amnesty for MEF members is for acts "in retaliation against the forceful 
eviction of Malaitans from Guadalcanal."95 
While the TP A provides for reconciliation by "face to face" dialogue, there is no · 
requirement for those seeking amnesty to participate in the process. The wording is 
permissive, that is, "In order for reconciliation to be meaningful various parties to the 
conflict shall be allowed to involve themselves in face to face dialogue - at community, 
village, family, individual and organisational levels."96 
C Compliance with Geneva Conventions 
States are clearly obliged to prosecute and assist other states to prosecute grave 
breaches of the Conventions. An amnesty from prosecution given in the context of an 
international conflict would therefore be a breach of the Conventions. However, the same 
cannot be said for violations of Article 3 and Protocol II, which make no reference to a 
state's obligations in regard to prosecution. 
Quite surprisingly, given the tenor of the Conventions as a whole, Protocol II 
arguably encourages states not to prosecute when the war is internal. Article 6 of Protocol 
II provides rules relating to trials and penalties for criminal offences related to armed 
conflicts and states: 9-
At the end of hostilities. the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the 
broadest possible anmesty t-0 persons \+ho have participated in the armed 
conflict. or those who have been deprived of their liberty for reasons related to 
the c01illict. whether they are interned or detained. 
There is some debate as to the meaning of this clause. One view is that the 
intention was only to encourage amnesties in line with "combatant immunity", that is 
actions taken by combatants that are lawful in war, such as killing an adversary 
combatant. The other view is that it refers to any actions during the conflict, including 
breaches of the Conventions and Protocol II . 
Karen Gallagher98 discusses the lack of the obligation to prosecute in internal 
conflicts and Article 6(5) of Protocol II. Her view is that the intention was to leave a 
broad discretion to states to grant amnesties, and supports this by reference to the Plenary 
Meeting otes for Protocol II and the rejection of proposals to limit the amnesty 
provision.99 The ICRC has put forward the opinion that the Article only refers to 
94 Amnesty AGt-2000 (S.I.) s3 (2) (a). 
95 above s 3(2) (b). 
96 TPA Part 5. (1) (a). 
97 Protocol II Article 6 para 5. 
98
" o Justice. No Peace : The Legalities and Realties of the Amnesty in Sierra Leone.'(2000) 23 T. 
Jefferson L. Rev. 1~9,162. 
99 above. 162. 
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combatant immunity. Its argument is that the amnesty provision was only required in 
relation to non-international conflicts, because the Conventions require combatants in international conflicts to be repatriated at the end of hostilities, whereas in internal 
conflicts -combatants can be prosecuted for crimes which would not be breaches of 
humanitarian law. This view was communicated to the Prosecutor of the ICTY. 100 Both 
of the above refer to an attempt b.y the Soviet defegation at the Diplomatic Conference in 1977 to limit the amnesty provision to. exclude those guilty of crimes against humanity 101 
from the amnesty provisions and provide for states to make rules for their punishment. 102 
The defeat of the Soviet proposal to limit the provision to exclude crimes against humanity, which by definition widespread or systematic attacks, and the most senous type of violation., must have more weight than a statement of a point of view. 
The combatant-only theory is better supported by reference to other articles and 
the principles of the Conventions and Protocols. There is a clear contradiction in prohibiting the listed acts in Article 4(2) of Protocol II "at any time and in any place' , 
obliging states to repress all breaches of the Conventions, and then encouraging the state to give amne~ties to those that ignore the prohibitions. If the provision was intended to be 
all encompassing there would be a conflict within the provisions in the event that parties to internal conflicts did make an agreement to bring all of the Geneva Conventions into 
effect as encouraged in Article 3. However, despite the seeming lack of logic in prohibiting acts and then encouraging states not to punish the violators, the plain meaning 
of words "broadest possible", do not indicate an intention to limit amnesties. There seems to be no reason for not using word~ such as "lawful acts of war" if that was the intention. 
The lack of an explicit obligation to prosecute breaches in internal conflicts can also be viewed as supportive of the legality of blanket amnesties 
The South African Constitutional Court interpreted Article 6(5) to impose a 
requirement to grant amnesties. It upheld the constitutionality of the Truth and Reconcili.ation Commission's ability to. grant amnesty after individual petition, disclosure, 
and investigation of the acts for which amnesty is requested .103 The petitioners had argued, inter alia, that the grave breach provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
prohibited amnesty. The Court rejected the argument on the position of international law in South Africa's constitutional scheme being that international instruments were not part 
of the municipal law unless enacted 10-t and, although the court doubted that Protocol II applied, it said "[P]rotocol II actually requires. the authorities n power,_ after the end of 
hostilities, to grant amnesty to those previously engaged in the conflict. 10 
100 Cited in Douglass Cassel "Accountability For International Crime And Serious Violations Of Fundamental Human Rights: Lessons From The Americas: Guidelines For International Response To Amnesties For Atrocities .. (1996) 59 Law & Contemp. Prob 197. 218. However. the IRCR interpretation is apparently ambiguous in that it does not take the \iew that humanitarian law absolutely excludes amnesties. See Cassel . fn 128. 
101 The Rome Statute in Article 7 defines crimes against humanity as acts (as listed) committed as pan of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population. with knowledge of the attack. 10'.!Gailagher. above. 162. 
103 Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of S. Africa [1996] (~) SALR 671 (CC). 104 A Z-lPO, above. para 26. 
105 .-lZ-lPO, above. para 29. 
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Other domestic courts have taken this view. 106 While such decisions are open to 
criticism, the ICRC view that it applies and was only intended to apply, to combatant 
immunity seems to lack a solid foundation. Article 6(5) may well have to be considered 
by the ICC should a prosecution be taken for an offence that is only an offence by virtue 
of Article 3 or Protocol II. 
D Compliance with customary international law 
Customary international law is. sourced from the rules states follow out of a sense 
of legal obligation and their actual practice. 107 State practice can include treaties, 
legislation, policy statements and possibly, resolutions of the UN general assembly 
intended to be binding and adopted without objections from a significant group of states. 
Once a rule is accepted as customary law it is binding on all states unless they have 
consistently objected to it. Crimes against humanity are a creature of customary law.108-
The actual practice of states does not support the contention that breaches of 
humanitarian_ law in internal conflicts should be prosecuted or that states should not grant 
amnesties. As already stated, many states have resolved internal conflicts by the granting 
of an amnesty and there are no signs. that the p.ractice is slowing despite protestationS- of 
human rights organisations. Prosecutions are the exception rather than the rule. 109 
The UN has passed several resolutions on amnesties. However, while they have 
been generally supportive of prosec_utions, none can be viewed as evidence of customary 
international law as they were not accepted with overwhelming support and are advisory 
rather than mandatory in nature. 110 A recent Security Council resolution, Resolution 1325 
on Women, Peace and Security, implicitly recognises the difficulties in outlawing 
amnesties by the use of the words "where feasibfe"". Cfause 11 reads: 111 
Emphasises the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to 
prosecute those responsible for genocide_ crimes against humanity. and war 
crimes including those relating to se.x-ual and other violence against women and 
girls. and in this regard stresses the need to exclude these crimes. where 
feasible, from amnesty provisions. 
The UN has on several occasions endorsed peace agreements where an amnesty 
has been a feature . It has also rejected the amnesty for serious violations of international 
106 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, "Combating Impunity: Some Thoughts On The Way Forward" (1996) 93 
AUT Law & Contemp Probs 93 , 97. 
107Restatement Third of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 102 (2) (1987). 
108 Michael P. Scharf "The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court'" 
(1999) 32 Cornell Int'l L.J. 507,518. 
109 See Karen Gallagher "No Justice. No Peace: The Legalities and Realities of Atllilesty in Sierra Leone'· 
(2000) 23 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 149, 15-l. And for examples of prosecutions resulting.from internal conflicts 
Thomas Graditzky "Individual criminal responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in non-international anned conflicts." (1998) 322 IRRC 29, 38. 
11° Karen Gallagher, above, 154. 
Il l S/RES/1325 (2000) 40 ILM 2. 500. 
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humanitarian law in the case of Sierra Leone. Before signing the Lome Peace Agreement, 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, added a reservation: 11 2 
The United Nations interprets the amnesty that the amnesty and pardon in 
article nine of this of the agreement shall not apply to the international crimes 
of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and serious violations of 
international law. 
Subsequently the Security Council has adopted a resolution requesting the 
Secretary General create a special court by negotiation with the government of Sierra 
Leone to bring accountability for the serious crimes committed in Sierra Leone.1n This 
resolution may well have not arisen but for hostilities resuming and the ineffectiveness of 
the truth and reconciliation process provided for in the Lome Accord. 
E Human rights, compensation and customary law in the Solomon Islands 
The legalities of amnesties can be questioned in the broader context of human 
rights that apply whether or not there is a situation of armed conflict. Rights such as the 
right to life, the prohibition on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment are 
considered so fundamental that they apply in all situations 114and cannot be derogated 
from. By implication, there is an argument that states can never legitimately declare 
national amnesties for violations of these rights. n s 
Although these treaties do not expressly require states to prosecute violators, they 
do obligate states to "ensure" the rights enumerated therein. There is growing recognition 
that the duty to ensure rights implies a duty to hold specific violators accountable and 
provide redress for victims. 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has held that amnesties are 
generally incompatible with states' obligations under Article 7 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).1t6 The Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights in Article 8 provides that, "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the 
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted to him by 
the constitution or by law." 
The Solomon Islands Constitution embodies internationally recognised 
fundamental human rights. The Honiara Peace Accord, one of the three agreements that 
failed to stop the conflict, recorded, "In the case of those that committed particular 
offences the process of law will take its course, there being no constitutional provision 
11
" The reservation was added so close to sigriing that it does not appear in early copies of the Lome 
Accord. Human Rights Watch. " The Sierra Leone Amnesty Under International Law" Human Rights 
Watch (1999), available at http://www.hnv.org/campaigns/sierra/int-law2.htm. 113 UN Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) 40 ILM 248. 
114 ICCPR, Articles 6 and 7 in combination with Article -k 
115 Kristin Henrard "The Viability of National Amnesties In View of The Increasing Recognition of 
Individual Criminal Responsibility at International Law"(l999) 8 MSU-DCL J. lnt"L 595. 615. 116 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Conunent No 20. 
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for amnesty." 117 The perceived problem was ostensibly overcome by amending the 
Constitution 118 to remove the power of the Director of Prosecutions to prosecute those 
119 who have been granted an amnesty. The amending act also states that members of the 
Solomon Islands police force and prison services would not be subject to discipline for 
actions carried out in connection with security operations between 5 June and 15 October 
2000. 120 
The amendment does not refer to the issue of compensation for victims of 
breaches of fundamental rights nor has legislation yet been passed to cover civil 
immunity for those given an amnesty as recorded in the TP A. 121 The Constitution 
provides .for compensation to -be -paid if rights -have -been contravened -by way -of 
application to the High Court, which determines the amount of compensation payable. 122 
The TP A provides for compensation to be provided for loss of life on a customary basis. 
However, the provision is only permissive, rather than obligatory, "Customary means 
may be agreed between concerned persons-and-communities in connection with killings 
of persons during the course of the crisis." 123 
Assuming the TPA is fully implemented, v1ct1ms have no right as such to 
compensation or any other effective remedy as required by Article 8 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. The government has agreed to make all efforts to secure 
assistance from its development partners to pay compensation for damage to or loss of 
property including businesses, employment and investments.124 It has accepted claims for 
loss of lives and abuses, but this process has been ongoing and is not a directly related to 
the TPA or the conflict. Earlier pay-outs to the Guale as compensation for killings since 
independence and other payments to Malaitan parents. who claimed their ehildren were 
raped at boarding school on Guadalcanal led to a precedent of SI $100,000m a life for 
deaths during the conflict. Compensation was paid -for people killed in the pre-conflict 
period, even though those responsible had been prosecuted.126 There are many other 
instances of the government paying on "kastom" 127 basis due to the location of 
government in Honiara, including to Malaitans. 12&-
11 7 The Honiara Peace Accord (6) (i) < http://www.commerce.gov.sb/rninistries/Beneath _ 
Guadalcanal 3.htm> (last accessed 9 September 2001). 
118 Constituti-;n (Amendment) Act 200 l (SD. 
119 above. s 2. 
120 above, s 3. 
121 Information gained from several informal sources. 
m The Constitution of the Solomon Islands. Art 17. 
123 Loss of Lives and Property [l] (b) . 
124 as above, [2]. 
125 This equates to $18.540 USD or $45.756 NZD using exchange rate on 27 September 2001. 126 This information is from Bob Pollard of the Civil Society Peace Office in Solomon Islands. Email 
retained by author dated 24 September 2001. 
127 Kastom is the Pidgin English word for customary. 
128 See generally David Akin "Compensation and the Melanesian State: Why the Kwaio Keep Claiming'· (1999) 11 Contemporary Pacific Journal 35. The article is specifically about Kwaio people. indigenous to Malaita but includes some reference to more recent claims based on events in Honiara or Guadalcanal . 
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As part of the cease-fire agreement made prior to the TP A, the parties agreed to 
stop making claims on the government for compensation and there have been statements 
made by the government since then to the effect that there will be no more compensation 
claims accepted. While the issue of compensation and reconciliation on a customary basis 
is beyond the scope of this paper, not all claims that have been accepted by the 
government have been paid out due to lack of funds. Compensation payments continue to 
be controversial. There are media reports of money for compensation going missing from 
the government coffers and inadequate investigation for claims made for losses, and 
compensation payments have been blamed for the government having no funds to pay 
salaries to public servants. From the information available, there have been several 
incidents since the TP A where individuals have made compensation claims at gunpoint to 
the government and individuals. but no substantial payments have been made by 
individuals to victims. 129 
While customary law has been preserved by the Constitution, it is only to the 
extent that no other provision is made by Parliament. no In R v Loumi and others [1984] 
SILR 51, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the customary "payback" 
amounted to a legal duty to kill ,. and therefore the charge of murder should be reduced to 
manslaughter on the basis it was inconsistent with the right to life embedded in the 
Constitution. The concept of retaliation or paying back is certainly not unique to 
Melanesian culture. However, such customary means of .justice appear to have more 
legitimacy than they have in more develop.ed countries. In the Solomon Islands 
customary law is still the most relevant law.131 
Although victims may receive compensation through the government, and some 
may share the view that the government is an adversary and can be blamed for losses, the 
process seems to be well short of being an effective remedy. Those who committed 
human rights abuses have the same access to compensation as those that took no part in 
the hostilities or acted lawfully, and as previously stated, there is no nexus with the right 
to compensation and breaches of humanitarian law during the conflict. Victims ' families 
are not entitled to receive information about what happened to family members who were 
lost or have an apology or other form of reconciliation with the perpetuators. While there 
have been s.ome public displays of reconciliation and .forgiveness, not all former 
combatants have participated in these 132 and there has not been a formal or public 
investigation into events during the conflict. To date the Amnesty International 
investigation, completed part way through the conflict,- is the only report detailing events 
d d. f · 133 an recor mg statements o witnesses. 
On the face of it, the process outlined in the TP A does not provide victims with an 
acceptable level of justice. It is contrary to internationally accepted fundamental rights 
and the Solomon Islands Constitution that guarantees the same rights . 
129 Bob Pollard above. 
130 The Solomon Islands Constitution. Article 76. 
131 TI1e Law Reform Conunission Annual Report 1996 (Honiara. 1996) 10. 
132 Bob Pollard above. 
133 "Solomon Islands: A forgotten conflict" Amnesty International (7 September 2000) 
<http://www.web.arnnesty.org/ai.nsi/index/ASA+30052000> (last accessed 18 August 2001). 
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F Utility of amnesties 
Regardless of the legalities of the Solomon Islands amnesty, it could be justified 
on moral grounds if it was effective in stopping the conflict and preventing further human 
rights abuses. However, there is a view, supported by some experience, that amnesties 
encourage further abuses. A study by Louis Joint, Special Rapporteur of the UN Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities concluded 
that unresolved human rights abuses can lead to contempt for the law and further 
abuses. 
134 
Fact-finding missions in Chile and Uruguay indicated that amnesties and lack 
of prosecution contributed to increases in human rights abuses. 135 In Sierra Leone, abuses 
by the RUF continued after the signing of the .Lome Accord. However, -there was a 
substantial reduction in abuses in the first year after the signing of the accord. 136 The 
leader of the RUF was arrested after taking UN peacekeepers hostage and killing civilian 
protesters in May 2000; the amnesty only related to events up to the signing of the 
accord.137 
The amnesty granted following the election of the first democratically 
government in South Africa received mixed reviews. It, however, can not be compared to 
amnesties such as the one in Sierra Leone and the Solomon Islands. In South Africa the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission functioned as intended and people who may have 
been convicted of serious crimes but for the amnesty participated in the processes of the 
Commission. In all the circumstances of South Africa it is reasonable to take the view 
that the amnesty and its associated processes probably reduced potential harm, rather than 
increasing the likelihood of further human rights abuses. Mozambique, which granted an 
amnesty to combatants after I6 years of civil war, is an example of peace, eventualiy, 
following such a settlement. 138 
It is too early to say whether the amnesty in the Solomon Islands will achieve its 
purpose, although the signing of the TP A has been more effective, in at least pausing 
hostilities, than the earlier negotiated peace agreements. The terms of the amnesty as far 
as requirements on combatants are minimal. The only requirements for amnesty are to 
return stolen property and relinquish arms to the International Peace Monitoring Team by 
the set date. There is a recommendation that the date be extended to 30 September 2001 , 
some 10 months later than the original date set of 15 November 2000. However, a 
breakout-of further violence, including the killing of.an IFM commander-by the MEF in 
September 2001 139, has resulted in a suspension ofthe second review ofthe TPA process. 
134 Report to the General Assembly UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub2/1997/20. 
135See Douglass Cassel "Accountability For International Crime And Serious Violations Of Fundamental 
Human Rigl1ts: Lessons From The Americas: Guidelines For International Response To Amnesties For 
Atrocities"(l996) 59 Law & Contemp. Prob 197,215. 
136 Karen Gallagiler "No Justice, No Peace: The Legalities and Realities of Amnesty in Sierra Leone~ 
(2000) 23 T. Jefferson L Rev 149,162. 
137 Karen Gallagiler, as above. 157. 
138 Karen Gallagiler, as above, 167. 
139
" Police Hunt Killers" (24 September 2000) SJBC Headline News. 
<http://commerce.gov. sb/Others/sibc _news_ September2001. htm>(last accessed 2 October 2001 ). 
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The report on compliance with the terms of the TP A by the Peace Monitoring 
Council, completed in July 2001, estimate there are 500 high powered weapons, out of an 
estimated 1500, that have not been returned. 140 The guns have been used to threaten and 
at least on one occasion, kill. No one has been arrested for actions during the conflict 
because they have failed to obtain an amnesty or failed to comply with -its terms. t 4 t 
Reportedly some combatants are keeping weapons for protection, fearing revenge for 
actions taken during the conflict, some-do not believe the conflict is over and others that a 
scheme may be introduced whereby the weapons will be purchased from them. 142 
Combatants have been paid for work connected with other aspects of the TP A; for 
example, former militant commanders were paid by the government for a period of time 
to collect weapons. The report states that when funds stopped flowing so did collection 
activities as well as information about the location of weapons, something the militant 
leaders undertook to provide in the TP A. 143 The payments coupled with individuals who 
committed breaches only being required to return stolen property and weapons must 
contribute to a sense of impunity. The combatants who, for example, threatened nursing 
staff and shot two hospitalised combatants in a hospital ward 144 and beat an 80-year-old 
civilian without provocation 145 have been treated no differently than those who acted 
humanely. This view is admittedly one from the outside, but is based on a belief in some 
universal similarities in human nature. 
Compounded with this lack o( distinction between types of actions taken in the 
conflict, there are no indications that non-compliance, with even these basic terms, may 
lead to prosecutions. No actions have been taken against those who have not returned 
weapons used for offences during the conflict~ the amnesty has clearly not worked as a 
sufficient incentive for those holding a third of the weapons. 
The media reports on the Solomon Islands show the tensions are not over, but the 
incidents involving firearms have been relatively isolated and the situation over the last 
year has been more settled than it was during the conflict. Former MEF militants have 
used guns. outside the Prime Minister's Office -to demand compensation payments they 
believed were due to them from the govemment. 146 This incident revealed an interesting 
side to the post-conflict situation, partial respect for process by other MEF militants (also 
armed in defiance of the TP A). They arrested the two men and delivered them to the 
police station. One assumes the 'arresting' MEF militants were not prosecuted. In 
140 Peace Monitoring Council TPA: Compliance by the Parties (13 July 2001) 22. Copy held by author. 
141 However. there have been some arrests for illegal possession of weapons. TI1e PMC reports that the 
treatment of those still in possession of weapons is erratic and inconsistent. with some cases clearly being 
ignored. Peace Monitoring Council. above, 21. 
142 Peace Monitoring Council, above. 23 . 
143 Peace Monitoring Council. above. 22. 
144 "Solomon Islands: A forgotten conflict" Amnesty International (7 September 2000) 12. 
<http.://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsi/index/ ASA430052000> (last viewed 18 August 2001). 
145 "Solomon Islands: A forgotten conflict" above. 17. 
1
•
16 "Tirreats Continue" SJBC Headline News (7 September 2001) 
<http://commerce.gov. sb/Others/sibc _news_ September200 l.htm>(last accessed 10 September 2001 ). 
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another incident an armed militant interrupted a government meeting demanding a 
cheque be given to him, but was persuaded to leave without shots being fired by an 
explanation of the government's financial situation. Most weeks over the last year have 
reports of threats, arsons and general lawlessness linked with former militants. More 
serious incidents include the ambush and shooting of Ezekiel Alebua, Premier of the 
Guadalcanal Provincial Government on 1 June 2001 . Six to 12 masked men in military 
attire ambushed his vehicle and fired several shots. Premier Alebua survived the attack. 147 
One of the more ominous signS- has been the slaying and mutilation of an IFM 
Commander on 27 September by a special constable.14s- The arrested man was released a 
few days later, the only explanation given by the prison service being that it was for his 
safety.149 Despite the assurances and attempts to play down the latest killing as 
unconnected with the conflict, the peace agreement appears to be unravelling. 
G Necessity of amnesty 
The ~olomon Islands amnesty has the hallmarks of an agreement where the 
militants set the terms and the third party, the government, had very little bargaining 
power. A New Zealand official who observed the negotiations in Townsville in the latter 
days said the negotiation process appeared to be between the two militant groupS- rather 
than one where the government was also a party. 1 so This raises question of the degree to 
which there was any real choice as to its terms. The justice system had disintegrated and 
the police force no longer had an id~ntity distinct from the militants . While there was 
assistance from New Zealand and Australian governments during the peace negotiations, 
this was limited to the provision of neutral facilities to conduct the negotiations. The 
former Prime Minister, Mr Ulufa' alu, has a more cynical view, "[D]eposed Prime 
Minister Ulufa'alu rails against what he calls "an old-style criminal mafia whose 
members, he claims, "designed this ethnic tension, were rewarded with government, and 
are now millionaires. "" 151 
Amnesties that are granted as a result of the government being powerless to effect 
any alternative,. or self-amnesties, those granted by the same people who will benefit 
from them, are the least likely to provide an effective alternative to prosecution. In the 
first case, which may well be true of the Solomon Islands ', the government, 
independently of the goodwill of the combatants, will probably also be powerless to 
enforce any provisions that limit the breadth of the amnesty. Self-amnesties are the class 
of amnesty naturally viewed as the most repugnant to justice. 
147 "Broken Nation: With a peace deal in tatters. the Solomon Islands remains divided. its economy shattered and its people held to ransom by lawless gunmen·' Time International (20 August 200 l ). 148 "Police in Solomon Islands arrest man over IFM Commander killing" World News From Radio Australia (27 September 2001). Available at http://www.abc.net.au. (last accessed 2 October 200i ). 149 "Prisoner Released" SJBC Headline News (2 October 2001) 
<http://commerce.gov.sb/Others/sibc _news_ October200 l.htm>(last accessed 2 October 2001). 15° Conversation with author (25 September 2001). 
151 "Broken Nation: With a peace deal in tatters, the Solomon Islands remains divided. its economy shattered and its people held to ransom by lawless gunmen·' Time Jncernational (20 August 2001 ). 
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H Rome Statute 
Questions have been raised during 152 and after the formulation of the Rome 
Statute as to how a prosecutor acting -for the ICC would respond to an amnesty given by a 
state. 153 The preamble to the Rome Statute includes the following as the purpose of the 
ICC: "Affirms the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole must not go unpunished and their effective prosecution must be ensured." Once a 
crime qualifies as "most serious" and "of concern to the international community as a 
whole" it is clear that the intention is for prosecution and punishment to be effected. An 
amnesty from prosecution is not listed as a defence in the Rome Statute; it contains no 
reference to amnesties_ However, there are means by which amnesties can be considered. 
Prosecutions must be preceded by an investigation by the Prosecutor for the ICC. 
Investigations can be initiated in one of three ways; by referral for a State that is party to 
the Rome Statute, by referral -from the Security Council or by the Prosecutor's own 
initiative_ 154 None of the methods require consent of a state party on whose territory the 
crime occurred -or the State -of which -the individual to be investigated is a national. 
Consent is only required from a State which is not a party to the treaty_ 155 Therefore, 
once a State is a party to the treaty it no longer has the power to prevent a prosecution of 
its nationals who commit crimes within the territory. 156 
However, if a matter is referred for investigation, the investigation or prosecution 
can be halted by a resolution of the .Security Council or by way of the Prosecutor' s 
discretion. A resolution of the Security Council to prevent an investigation or prosecution 
should be made in conformity with the principle and provisions of the United Nations 
Charter, 157 
[N]amely: (1) where the Security Council has detennined the existence of a 
threat to the peace. a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression W1der Article 
3 9 of the Charter: 
(2) Where the resolution requesting the court·s deferral is 
consistent with purposes of and principals of the United Nations 
maintaining peace and security. resolving threatening situations in 
conformity with the principles of justice and international law. and 
152 The United States presented a paper at the preparatory conference for the establishment of the ICC advocating the Court should take into account amnesties when deciding whether to prosecute. See Michael P. Scharf " The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court" ( 1999) 32 
Cornell Int ' l LJ. 507, 508 and fn 7. 
153 See Dr Kristen Henrard "The Viability of National Amnesties in View of the Increasing Recognition of Individual responsibility At International Law" (1999) 8 MSU-DCL J Int ' l L 595: Michael Scharf "The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court" ( 1999) 32 Cornell J Int ' l L 507: Charles Villa-Vicencio "Why Perpetrators Should Not Always Be Prosecuted: Where the International Criminal Court and Truth Conunissions Meet" (2000) 49 Emory L J 205 _ 154 Rome Statute, Article 13. 
155 Article 12 (3) . 
156 Article 126 (3) prohibits reservations_ 
157 Michael p Scharf " The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court" 
(1999) 32 Cornell Int'l L J 507. 523 _ 
promoting respect for human rights and freedoms under Article 2-l of the 
UN Charter. 
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Michael Scharf suggests. the factors listed below be considered when determining 
whether an amnesty should be recognised: 158 
• the existence of an international obligation to prosecute 
• the necessity of the amnesty to end a conflict 
• the existence of a mechanism to attribute individual responsibility and discover 
the truth about victims 
• provision of reparation or compensation to victims 
• provisions to ensure breaches of humanitarian law and human rights abuses do not 
reoccur 
• any steps that have been taken to punish the guilty with non-criminal sanctions. 
A prosecutor could also consider the above factors when exercising his or her 
discretion. The prosecutor's discretion, after investigation to not prosecute, is "if 
prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account all of the 
circumstances". 159 
A state could also ask for any case to be dismissed on the basis it was 
investigating or prosecuting the same offence.160 If, for example a State had set up a truth 
commission as South Africa did, its grounds for requesting an investigation be halted 
would the effectiveness of its truth commission as an investigation into crimes. The 
Rome Statute does not limit such a request only to situations where there is or will be a 
prosecution. 
The consequence of these provisions could bolster the power of states when faced 
with negotiating an amnesty to end an internal conflict. If the decision to prosecute is not 
exclusively within the power of that State and there is a perception that other states, the 
Security Council or the Prosecutor may decide to take action and disregard an amnesty, 
the ICC could act as a powerful incentive to negotiate an amnesty that is acceptable to the 
international community and in accordance with internationally recognised principals of 
justice. The potential for prosecution to be initiated externally may also act as an 
incentive for individuals who are given an amnesty to abide by its terms. States that have 
the will to provide justice but lack a functioning criminal justice system can point to the 
possibility of an international prosecution to ensure there is a just alternative to 
prosecution put in place. Even governments that lack the will to provide justice in the 
form of prosecution may temper their actions to avoid the prospect of investigations and 
prosecutions. 
When conditions of an amnesty have not been complied with and the State post-
conflict still lacks the resources to prosecute, a referral or threat of a referral to the ICC 
could also provide some necessary means of either enforcing the amnesty conditions or 
158 Scharf. as above. 526. 
159 Rome Statute Article 53 (2). 
160 Article l 7(a). 
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encouraging compliance. Again, another state, which may have nothing to lose 
politically, can provide the threat or referral to the ICC. 
The Rome Statute has no immediate relevance to the Solomon Islands conflict as 
it will only come into effect when 60 countries have ratified it 161 and crimes committed 
' prior to ratification will not be covered. However, the ICC, if and when operational, may 
be able to affect the granting of amnesties by virtue of its power to prosecute serious 
breaches of Article 3 in future conflicts. 
VI CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to see the utility of expanding the application of the Geneva 
Conventions to apply in their entirety to internal conflicts. To believe an extension of the 
Conventions' application would make any real difference to the treatment of protected 
persons would ignore the events of the last 50 years. In addition, many of the provisions 
sit more comfortably with the bygone era of wars being conducted, not only between 
states, but also by regular armies. In internal conflicts, it is less likely that combatants on 
both sides will be professional soldiers. In recent internal conflicts, the objectives have 
included the removal or eradication of civilians of a particular ethnicity. Attempting to 
ensure such combatants do not harm those civilians, let alone treat them without 
distinction based on their ethnicity, by updating the law that legalises killing the same 
people should they resort to arms, appears to be an absurd and a futile exercise. 
Even if all the theoretical and practical problems of determining the type of 
internal conflict it would not prevent states granting amnesties in the hope they would 
end hostilities . 
Provisions for or about amnesties do not exist in any international treaties or other 
instruments bar Article 6 of Protocol II. However guidelines for amnesties have been 
articulated for use in specific regions and promoted for adoption on an international basis. 
For example, Douglass Cassel lists 10 guidelines drawn from the rulings from the Inter-
American Court and Commission on Human Rights and inter-American human rights 
treaties, for use in the Arnericas. 162 Madeline Morris has advocated for guidelines for 
preventing impunity, presumably in the form of a treaty, which would include specific 
reference to the ICC as a backup or failsafe mechanism. 163 A soft-law approach, drawing 
on principles gleaned from international instruments and the jurisdiction of international 
criminal tribunals and courts, has the advantage of flexibility, as does the discretion to 
prosecute in the ICC. However, if the crime is only a crime that can be prosecuted 
because it is a breach of Article 3 or Protocol II, the existence of Article 6(5) may 
161 Article 126. 
162 Douglass Cassel "Accow1tability For International Crime And Serious Violations ofFWldamenta1 
Human Rigllts: Lessons from the Americas: Guidelines for International Response to Amnesties for 
Atrocities" (1996) 59 Law & Contemp. Probs. 197,227. 
163 Madeline H Morris "International Guidelines Against Impunity: Facilitating AccoW1tability"( l996) 59 
AUT Law and Contemp. Probs. 29, 34. 
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continue to be a thorn in the side of attempts to prosecute despite all the reasons that may be advanced to support the principle that amnesties should be consistent with internationally recognised principle of justice. 
The case concerning the extradition of the former head of state of Chile, 164 General Pinochet, is a recent examgte of national amnesty being regarded as ineffective where there is a duty to prosecute. t .s- However, that principle only applies to international crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity where the duty, despite the lack of a consistent practice, is established. These crimes can occur in the context of an internal armed conflict, but identical actions, on a smaller scale in an internal conflict do not trigger a duty to prosecute. Not only is there no duty to prosecute in Article 3, Protocol II's Article 6(5) positively encourages states to give amnesties. Any internationally agreed guidelines for prosecution would be wise to specifically overcome the plain meaning interpretation of Article 6(5) and restrict the granting of amnesties to combatant immunity or ensure they are not excluded from examination as to their conformity with principles of justice. A prosecution in the ICC could also by stymied by Article 6 (5) in cases where ~n amnesty had been granted. 
The potential of the ICC jurisdiction to influence amnesties will depend more on the willingness of states, possibly in regional organisations with the state in conflict, to refer or threaten to refer to the ICC, in situations when unjust amnesties may be negotiated. It will also depend on a change of perception and practice that only the most serious and publicized cases of human rights abuses are worthy of international prosecution. 
164 R v Bow Street Nfetropolitan Stipendiary Aiagistrates Court & Others, ex pane Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [1999] All ER 577. 
165 Although Pinochet ' s imnumity as a fom1er Head of State was the more prominent of issues conside_r~d by the House of Lords when considering the ex1radition request from the Sparush government. the dec1s10n also confirms that the amnesty given to Pinochet in 1978 was ineffective. TI1e crime alleged was one where there is a clear international duty to prosecute. that is. torture that as so widespread it constituted a crime against humanity. 
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
W752 
2001 
LAW LIBRARY 
A Fine According to Library 
Regulations is charged on 
Overdue Books 
PciA \_ V)g~ --
PLEAs.E ElURN BY 
0.5 AY 2008 
TO VV .U. INTERLOAN 
~f 11f ~[1l~1~11111 1i[1~ !1~111~111t1l~11~~~1111i11111 ~i1~ ij~ 
3 7212 00705811 6 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY 
OF 
WELLINGTON 
LIBRARY 


